Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag

Thomas Petermann • Martin Socher • Christine Wennrich

Control criteria for evaluation and decision-making for new technologies in the defense sector

TAB report no. 045. Berlin 1996, 173 pages

Summary

On the initiative of the Subcommittee on »Disarmament and Arms Control", TAB was commissioned to study the limits and possibilities of an early assessment of new technologies in the light of aspects of arms control policy.

The key issues of the project are: How can problematic consequences of technical developments be recognized early - if possible, already in the research and development (R&D) stage - from a political point of view, and how can risks be limited by institutions and procedures on a national and an international level? The next point investigated is whether arms control practice so far has included attempts at an early preventive political management of the technical dynamism in the arms sector. This evaluation shows that, especially in the field of weapons of mass destruction, at least some tentative approaches towards such early control can be recognized. This indicates that the preventive control of R&D is not a chimera, but is already political practice. However, further efforts are necessary so that the few activities focusing only on specific aspects can be expanded and a more systematic concept can be developed and put into effect politically.

Already in the very near future, a new aim for arms could emerge: a preventive containment of the technological dynamism currently found, especially in the conventional control sector, in the worldwide efforts to achieve structural modernization of the armed forces. This could be one way of preventing an expensive qualitative arms race, which would also generate mistrust. The report also pleads in favor of viewing preventive control of new technologies as part of a comprehensive arms control concept after the confrontation of political blocks. The reason for such a comprehensive approach stems from the absence of structures and processes guaranteeing transparency, from the absence of confidence and security building measures. Therefore the concept of preventive arms control and its »technological approach« have no firm base.

What is needed, in principle, is an expanded definition of arms control: R&D should be granted a position comparable to the position which weapons and equipment had by now; the principle of aftercare should be supplemented by the principle of preventive care. In order to help politics achieve primacy in the difficult-to-control dynamism in the arms sector, arms control must recognize and evaluate early those processes in which science and engineering developments with problematic potential uses and unintended consequences are advanced. The time saved in this way can be used to focus attention on such issues nationally and internationally and take initiatives when necessary.

To outline the basic elements of a concept of preventive arms control, six dimensions are discussed, which indicate the main approaches towards a constructive concept of preventive arms control, and which could offer guidance in a process of assessment and evaluation of new technologies: Threats to existing or intended arms control agreements and confidence and security building measures; risks for stability; new qualitative arms races; humanitarian international law; proliferation; aspects of dual use in R&D. These dimensions would roughly cover the relevant areas of risk and the political management opportunities. They open up a first way towards evaluation and can help to structure the political process of opinion forming and decision-making.

The widely debated dynamism of technology, the blurred boundaries between civilian and military technologies, and the close interconnection of technologies and areas of technology, raise the question wether there are analytical possibilities available to obtain insights early on into the potentials for military application of technologies.This issue is discussed in Section IV. It is shown, among other topics, how an overall monitoring of technology can bring into focus the military relevance of most (civilian) areas of technology, and how the identification of military systems relevant in the future could allow the potential military utilization of technologies at least to be roughly assessed, despite all the existing difficulties. A more detailed treatment of the I&C technologies (as exemplified by the so-called C3I systems) and of the class of non-lethal weapons shows, for two specific cases, how they can be assessed in the light of arms control policy. There is one clear result emerging from these consideration: Almost all civilian technologies have military relevance, the development of technology is characterized by extreme dynamism, and there is a high degree of interconnection and interaction within and among all areas of technology discussed.

Complexity, interconnection and dynamism mean that it is not impossible, but often very difficult to find out when and where civilian and military lines of developments move in different directions. A political evaluation and management of such developments is likely to be just as difficult in many cases. The analytical and political problems are treated in Section V. Despite all difficulties, what seems to be possible and feasible is this: Continuous observation and discussion of the fields of modern technology could create more transparency and allow trends to be defined. Although this would be an uncertain base on which to take decisions, it could allow some preliminary background information and orientations to be provided for the appropriate political measures to be taken.

Nevertheless, the task of politics remains difficult, i.e., to use the opportunities offered by science and technology for justified security interests, but also contribute to limiting the risks they incorporate. In addition, political measures may affect the rights of third parties and collide with other goals, such as those of security, research, and economic policies. However, much would be gained if more transparency could be created nationally and internationally, if the grounds on which political decision-makers decide were improved so that more clarity about the need for new military technologies and the goals and options connected with them could be achieved.

What are the consequences to be drawn for the political work of the German Federal Parliament? In the final section, options are presented for the introduction and practical application of the concept of preventive arms control. They are based on the rule of not building up any bureaucracies and not enacting unnecessary regulatory mechanisms. Instead, these options are to be connected to existing schemes, and careful development step by step is to be pursued.

On the national level, options are presented for integrating the preventive arms control concept in the executive branch and for improving the level of information of committees, and the optimization of working and decision-making processes of the Parliamentary Committees for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Budget. Options on an international level include strengthening the activities of the OSCE, as far as relevant to arms control policy, by incorporating the aspect of preventive arms control, and expanding the arms control activities of the UN. One option in this respect is the introduction of an international register of military research.

Initiatives to put into effect institutions and instruments of preventive arms control would be quite in line with the positive role Germany has often played in arms control in past years. Yet, much still needs to be done to make the concept of preventive arms control an accepted guiding vision.