Over the last 10 to 15 years, the rapid advances in the analysis and synthesis of genetic material (DNA), as well as in the targeted modification of genes in a wide variety of organisms using genome editing techniques, have simplified and greatly expanded the possibilities for researching and modifying biological systems and organisms. Computer-aided analysis and design processes are becoming an increasingly important tool in this field. These developments in molecular biology and biotechnology are often summarised under the term 'enginering biology' or 'synthetic biology' (see  TAB report summary „Synthetic biology – the next phase of biotechnology and genetic engineering") They have opened up new possibilities in basic research, for example in investigating gene and  molecular functions, and the causes of disease. They have also ushered in revolutionary developments in applied fields such as industrial biotechnology, for example in generating new synthetic pathways for chemicals in microorganisms, and in the development of new medicines and treatment options including gene therapies for previously incurable diseases and gene- and cell-based cancer immunotherapies.

These advances in molecular biology and biotechnology are increasingly converging with recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and the automation of laboratory processes. Larger datasets on biological molecules and their functions are enabling increasingly powerful AI models to emerge. These models are playing an ever more important role in the analysis and design of biological molecules and processes, as well as in the research and development of corresponding applications.

Since its inception, synthetic biology and its potential applications have been accompanied by discussions about the risks posed by possible laboratory incidents  or misuse. The focus has particularly been on the accessibility of technological developments for modifying molecules or organisms (such as DNA synthesis or genome editing) by non-experts or individuals not affiliated with established scientific institutions. With AI playing an increasingly important role and interacting with biotechnological capabilities, these discussions have intensified once again. In particular, an international security debate has emerged in recent years that focuses heavily on the risk of misuse through the potential production of biological weapons, as well as the associated security issues. The debate essentially centres on three concerns: firstly, that these developments could facilitate the production of dangerous biological agents or biological weapons, particularly for non-experts or non-state actors; secondly, that more dangerous or novel biological agents or weapons could be developed, increasing the potential for harm or damage; and thirdly, that the effectiveness of biosecurity and biodefence measures could be reduced or undermined.

Objective and approach

Built on a broad  information base, the project will provide a focused analysis of the potential security risks of recent biotechnological developments and their interactions with developments in AI. It also aims to identify control and regulatory options and discuss ways to further develop them to minimise these security risks and strengthen the non-proliferation of potential biological weapons.

To this end, an up-to-date overview of relevant developments in biotechnology and synthetic biology and their convergence with recent AI developments will be provided. On that basis, possible security risks discussed in the scientific literature and by various societal actors (e.g. developers/companies, researchers, policy-advice organisations, security experts) will be presented and the underlying arguments or evidence discussed. Finally, building on this, the existing control and regulatory options at the national (German) and supra- or international level will be characterised, the scientific, social and political debate on their sufficiency or the need for new measures will be examined, and options for action will be derived. As usual, the TAB analysis will be based on publicly available knowledge, supplemented by expert assessments in the form of written papers.

Project status

As part of the TAB project, two expert reports were commissioned: one on the current status of national and international regulations and control measures, and another on the technical requirements, knowledge, and experience necessary for the manufacture of biological weapons. The evaluation of these reports, together with extensive further research by the TAB, forms the basis of the final report which is currently under review. The project's findings will be presented at public hearing on 8 July 2026. The meeting will discuss the project's findings and the issues it has addressed with members of the German Bundestag and experts.